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Abstract 
 
According to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), decision makers perceive outcomes as 
gains or losses from a reference point and behave differently depending on how the outcome is 
framed. Decision makers will be risk-averse if the perceived outcome is viewed as a gain and risk-
seeking if it is perceived as a loss.  Research applying prospect theory to the decision-making of tax 
preparers by using their client’s year-end payment status as the reference point has not been 
successful (see e.g., Duncan et al. 1988; Sanders and Wyndelts 1989; LaRue and Reckers 1989).  One 
possible explanation for the lack of consistent results in this area is that tax preparers do not 
internalize the framing of their client’s payment status and thus do not have a psychological 
commitment to the decision outcome.  It is the client who is in a gain or loss position, not the tax 
preparer.   
 
This paper reports the results of an experiment applying prospect theory and psychological 
commitment to tax preparer decision-making.  We hypothesized that tax preparers’ personal 
involvement in placing their client in a particular year-end tax situation (payment due or refund) will 
cause them to use the client’s year-end payment status as the reference point and to behave in a 
manner consistent with the predictions of prospect theory.  In particular, we hypothesized that 
personal involvement in placing their client in a year-end payment due situation will cause tax 
preparers to frame the decision as a loss and thus behave in a risk-seeking manner.   We also 
hypothesized that personal involvement in placing their client in a year-end refund situation will 
cause tax preparers to frame the decision as a gain and engage in more risk-averse behavior than tax 
preparers not so involved.   
 
Using a sample of 104 professional tax return preparers, we found no evidence that psychological 
commitment to their client’s year-end payment status caused tax preparers to behave in a manner 
consistent with prospect theory.  We did, however, find evidence that more experienced tax preparers 
took more aggressive tax-reporting positions than those with less experience.  We also found that 
males took more aggressive tax-reporting positions than females. 
 
Introduction  
 
ne of the major theories used to examine the decision-making of tax preparers is prospect theory (Duncan et 
al. 1988; Sanders and Wyndelts 1989; LaRue and Reckers 1989; Newberry et al. 1993; Schisler 1994).  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed prospect theory as an alternative to expected utility theory (von 
Neuman and Morgenstern 1944).  According to prospect theory, decision makers code outcomes in terms of gains and 
losses from a reference point, rather than final states of wealth (as assumed by expected utility theory).   The value 
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function applied to possible outcomes is an S-shaped curve that is concave for gains and convex for losses.  In addition, 
the slope of the value function is steeper for losses than for gains, as indicated in Figure 1. 
 
             Value 
 
 
 
  Losses Gains 
 
 
   
 
Prospect theory predicts that decision makers will behave differently depending on whether an outcome is 
framed as a gain or a loss.  Because of the slope of the value function, decision makers will be risk-averse in gain 
situations, and risk seeking in loss situations.     
 
Taxpayer Decision-making 
 
Research applying prospect theory to taxpayer decision-making typically has used year-end payment status as 
the reference point (see e.g., Chang et al. 1987; Schadewald 1989; Schepanski and Kelsey 1990; White et al. 1993; 
Chang 1995; Dusenbury 1994; Schisler 1996). Taxpayers who owe an additional amount of taxes at the end of the year 
(a tax due situation) are said to be in a loss position.  Prospect theory predicts that these taxpayers will be risk-seeking 
and therefore more willing to take aggressive tax positions.  Taxpayers who expect to receive a tax refund at the end of 
the year (a refund situation), on the other hand, are said to be in a gain position.   Prospect theory predicts that these 
taxpayers will be risk-averse and therefore not as likely to take aggressive tax positions.   
 
Although the results of these studies are not completely consistent, there is substantial evidence that taxpayers 
behave in a manner consistent with prospect theory when year-end payment position is used as the reference point.  
Taxpayers in a year-end tax payment position generally are more aggressive in tax reporting positions than taxpayers in a 
year-end tax refund position. 
 
Tax Preparer Decision-Making 
 
Research testing the predictions of prospect theory on the decision-making of tax preparers has been less 
successful than that conducted on taxpayers.  A number of studies have used the year-end payment status of the client as 
the decision frame.  A tax preparer with a client in a tax due position is viewed as being in a loss position and is 
predicted to be risk-seeking.  A tax preparer with a client in a tax refund position is viewed as being in a gain position 
and is predicted to be risk-averse.  Studies that have manipulated the decision frame in this manner have achieved mixed 
results. 
 
Duncan et al. (1988) used an ambiguous depreciation deduction situation to examine the effects of the 
probability of an IRS audit, risk preference of the client, and year-end payment status of the client on the income 
reporting recommendations of tax professionals.  Duncan et al. (1988) found weak (p = .059) support for the predictions 
Figure 1 — Value Function 
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of prospect theory.  Tax preparers adopted more aggressive positions when the taxpayer was underpaid and less 
aggressive positions when the taxpayer was overpaid.  Contrary to Duncan et al. (1988), however, Sanders and Wyndelts 
(1989) and LaRue and Reckers (1989) found no evidence in support of prospect theory when the year-end payment 
position of the client was used as the reference point.   
 
One possible reason for the inconclusive findings in the tax preparer area is that tax preparers do not have 
anything directly at stake in a client’s prepayment position.  It is the client taxpayer who is in the tax due or tax refund 
position, not the tax preparer. Although a zero payment position is a logical reference point for taxpayers to use, it may 
not be a logical reference point for tax preparers.  Tax preparers may not view a client’s additional payment or refund as 
the preparer’s loss or gain.  In addition, a tax preparer is more likely to be aware that it is the total amount of taxes, not 
the balance due at the end of the year, that has the most impact on a client’s overall wealth.  This explanation, although 
not conclusive, is consistent with research that has found evidence in support of prospect theory in situations where the 
tax preparer can be viewed as having a more direct stake in the client’s payment status (e.g. Schisler 1994; Newberry et 
al. 1993).
It is possible that the lack of consistent results in studies applying prospect theory to tax preparer decision-
making is caused by the tax preparers’ failure to frame a client’s tax due position as their own loss.  The tax preparers do 
not internalize the client’s situation.  As Kahneman and Tversky (1981, p. 458) stated, “The framing of acts can also 
reflect acceptance or rejection of responsibility for particular consequences and the deliberate manipulation of framing is 
commonly used as an instrument of self-control.”   
 
Psychological Commitment 
 
The psychological commitment literature has dealt primarily with the issue of whether personal involvement in 
a course of action causes decision makers to escalate their commitment to a failing course of action.  Staw (1976) found 
that subjects who were responsible for the initial decision to commit resources to a failing project subsequently tended to 
commit more resources to the project than subjects who were not personally responsible for the initial investment 
decision.  Since Staw’s (1976) initial research, this sunk cost effect has been found in numerous settings, and it is a well-
established phenomenon that decision makers tend to escalate their commitment to a failing course of action for which 
they are responsible.   
 
Although the precise explanation for escalation of commitment remains controversial (Brockner 1992), one of 
the most frequently cited explanations for the sunk cost effect is self-justification or rationalization.  Decision makers 
seek to rationalize their previous behavior or to defend themselves psychologically against adverse consequences by 
increasing commitment to the previous failing course of action, even if they would otherwise not pursue such a course of 
action (Staw 1976).  Because people do not like to admit that their past decisions were incorrect, they seek to reaffirm the 
correctness of their past decisions by becoming more committed to them (Brockner 1992). 
 
Self-justification can take the form of committing additional resources or risking additional errors (Whyte 
1986).  The willingness to increase risk in order to justify a previous course of action to which one is psychologically 
committed is particularly relevant to tax preparers.  Tax preparers frequently make recommendations to clients after 
considering tax-reporting positions with varying degrees of risk.  A tax preparer may be willing to accept more risk (by 
taking a more aggressive tax position) than he or she otherwise would in order to justify a previous decision (or tax 
estimate) that later proves to be incorrect. 
 
Relationship of Prospect Theory to Psychological Commitment 
 
This research uses both prospect theory and psychological commitment to study the decision-making of tax 
preparers.   We propose that psychological commitment plays an integrated role in determining how a decision maker 
frames a particular decision.  We hypothesize that a decision maker will be more likely to frame a decision as a loss, and 
therefore be risk-seeking, when he or she is psychologically committed to a previous decision.  The viability of such a 
proposal is hinted at by Whyte (1986, p. 316), who asserts that, under a prospect theory analysis, sunk costs are relevant 
only insofar as they influence the framing of decisions: 
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It is conceivable that reluctance to accept the reality of negative results, for the reasons suggested by 
Staw, may retard the process of adaptation to losses.  Thus, the establishment of a new account for a 
decision may not occur when it should, leading to the use of existing accounts which have already 
been used to record outcomes. 
 
In other words, because the personal attributes of the decision maker influence the framing of decisions, a situation 
where the decision maker is psychologically committed to a failing course of action causes him or her to seek to justify 
that action and leads to the use of the existing account. The existing account includes the failing course of action, which 
places it in a loss position.  Thus, the decision maker will frame the decision as a loss and be risk-seeking. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
As discussed previously, prospect theory suggests that decision makers will be risk-seeking when a decision is 
framed as a loss.  Additionally, personal involvement in a previous decision may influence the framing of a current 
decision.  We hypothesize that decision makers are more likely to frame a decision as a gain or loss to themselves if their 
prior involvement in an earlier decision has caused them to become psychologically committed to a client’s course of 
action started by their earlier decision.  Their desire to justify a previously incorrect decision (or tax estimate) to 
themselves and/or their client should cause them to frame the current decision as a loss when their previous decision (or 
tax estimate) has resulted in their client facing a year-end tax payment situation.  The framing of the decision as a loss 
will lead to risk-seeking behavior.  Application of this analysis to the decision-making of tax preparers leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Tax preparers who were actively involved in making estimated tax payment calculations for 
a client facing an unexpected tax payment upon filing his or her income tax return will take 
more aggressive tax reporting positions than tax preparers who were not actively involved in 
making estimated tax payment calculations for a client facing an unexpected tax payment 
upon filing his or her income tax return.   
 
Hypothesis One addresses the question of whether tax preparers who were actively involved in making 
estimated tax payment computations for a client facing an unexpected tax payment at year-end will be more aggressive 
than those tax preparers who were not actively involved.   What if the tax preparer’s miscalculation causes an 
overpayment of taxes during the year, rather than an underpayment?  Hypothesis Two addresses this issue.   
 
Tax preparers should not be as likely to frame the current decision as a loss if the prior miscalculation results in 
an unexpected tax refund, rather than an unexpected tax payment.  The tax preparer should have less need to justify his 
or her previous calculation to the client, who is not faced with making an unexpected payment.  In addition, taking a 
more aggressive tax position will result in the tax preparer’s previous estimate being even more incorrect by creating a 
larger refund.  Despite personal involvement in the incorrect estimated payment calculation, we hypothesize that a tax 
preparer will frame an unexpected tax refund position as a gain.   
 
Davis and Bobko (1986) found evidence that the level of escalation of commitment differs, depending on 
whether the outcome of the previous decision was positively or negatively framed.  Davis and Bobko (1986) studied 
escalation of commitment in a government funding situation.  The outcome of a job-training program was framed either 
negatively (“the program has failed to place 60.1% of all participants in either part-time or full-time jobs”) or positively 
(“the program has placed 39.9% of all participants in either part-time or full-time jobs”).  Davis and Bobko (1986) found 
that continued commitment to a failing course of action was greater when subjects were personally responsible for the 
initial decision, but only when the outcome was framed negatively.  Personal responsibility had no effect on continued 
commitment when the outcome was framed positively.   There was less need to justify their previous decision when the 
results were framed positively.  Applying this analysis to tax preparer decision-making, there should be less need for tax 
preparers to justify their previous calculation in an unexpected tax refund situation.  Tax preparers are likely to frame 
clients’ unexpected refunds positively, rather than negatively.  Prospect theory predicts that decisions makers will be 
risk-averse when the refund is framed positively.   Therefore, as discussed below, we predict that tax preparers who are 
psychologically committed to their client’s year-end tax situation will be more risk-averse than tax preparers who are  
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not psychologically committed.   
 
Although we predict that non-psychologically committed tax preparers will be risk-averse, they do not have 
enough at stake in their client’s year-end tax situation and therefore will not frame the situation and behave according to 
the value function of prospect theory.  Instead, their level of risk aversion is predicted to be consistent with expected 
utility theory, and the utility function of non-psychologically committed tax preparers will be less steep than that of 
psychologically committed tax preparers.  Because the slope of the value function under prospect theory is steeper than 
that under expected utility theory, tax preparers who are personally involved in calculating estimated tax payments 
should be more risk-averse than tax preparers who are not personally involved.  This leads to the following hypothesis:   
 
H2: Tax preparers who were actively involved in making estimated tax payment calculations for 
a client facing an unexpected tax refund upon filing his or her income tax return will take 
less aggressive tax reporting positions than tax preparers who were not actively involved in 
making estimated tax payment calculations for a client facing an unexpected tax refund upon 
filing his or her income tax return.   
 
Methodology 
 
A 2 x 2 design was employed, and participants were randomly assigned to one of four different experimental 
groups (referred to as groups A, B, C and D, respectively), as summarized in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
Experimental Design 
 
Withholding Status 
 
Payment Due   Refund 
Condition   Condition 
 
Tax Preparer  
Involvement in    Yes      Group A   Group B 
Calculating Estimated      
Tax Payments   No      Group C   Group D 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Participants were assigned to one of two tax preparer involvement conditions: personal involvement in 
calculating quarterly estimated tax payments and no personal involvement in calculating quarterly estimated tax 
payments.  Prior studies have tested prospect theory by simply manipulating the wording of the case scenario.  It would 
be difficult, however, to induce psychological commitment by having participants simply read a case scenario.  In order 
to achieve a more effective psychological commitment inducement, participants actually made estimated payment 
computations.   
 
In both conditions, participants were told that their client owns and operates a medium-sized C corporation 
engaged in building and selling manufactured homes.  In the no personal involvement condition, participants were told 
that their client keeps good records and prepares his own estimated tax payment calculations.  The tax preparer is 
involved only in preparing the client’s income tax return at the end of the year, not in calculating quarterly estimated tax 
payments.   
 
In the personal involvement condition, on the other hand, participants were told that their client is not interested 
in or knowledgeable of accounting and tax matters, and relies on the tax preparer extensively.  The client provides the tax 
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preparer with basic financial information and his thoughts on how he expects the business to do for the remainder of the 
year.  The tax preparer calculates the amount of the required quarterly estimated tax payment and sends the estimated 
payment form and instructions to the client.    
 
Participants in the personal involvement condition were first presented with basic information on the task they 
were asked to perform.  They were told that it is January of the current year and that one of the most important tasks they 
perform for their client is computation of the amount of quarterly federal estimated tax payments their client should 
make during the current year.  Participants were provided with three types of information: notes from a recent meeting 
with their client, financial information on the client (including an income statement and a balance sheet), and a Standard 
and Poor’s Industry Forecast for the month of January.  This forecast contains a summary of how the manufactured 
homebuilding industry is currently performing and a forecast of how the industry is expected to perform in the future.  
The entire experiment was administered via computer and participants were able to switch the computer between these 
three items of information and review each item as often as they desired.  They were then asked to compute the amount 
of quarterly estimated tax payments their clients should make during the year and enter those amounts into the computer. 
  
After the participants made their initial estimate, they were instructed to move to the next computer screen and 
were provided with additional information.  They were told that it is now June of the current year and they have just 
finished a mid-year meeting with their client.  One of the main objectives of the meeting was to determine whether their 
client’s estimated tax payments should be revised.   Participants were again provided with the three types of information 
and asked whether they would like to revise the quarterly estimated tax payments they set up in January.  If participants 
choose to revise the estimated payment schedule, they were asked to provide the amount of the revised estimated 
payments.  This second computation was designed both to make the experiment more realistic and to help induce 
psychological commitment by making the participants more involved in their client’s tax situation.  
 
Participants were also assigned to one of two year-end withholding status conditions: unexpected tax payment 
due upon filing their client’s income tax return (payment condition) or unexpected tax refund available upon filing their 
client’s income tax return (refund condition).  The payment condition represents a loss situation.  The refund condition 
represents a gain situation.   
 
In the payment condition, participants were told that their client was expecting no additional tax payment or 
refund upon filing his return but, because of a mistake in calculating quarterly estimated tax payments, will actually have 
an unexpected balance due.  Similarly, in the refund condition, participants were told that their client was expecting no 
additional tax payment or refund upon filing his return but, because of a mistake in calculating quarterly estimated tax 
payments, will actually receive an unexpected tax refund.  The balance due (refund) figures are without considering the 
potential deduction of an ambiguous item.  Thus, the balance due could be decreased, or the refund increased, by taking 
the ambiguous tax deduction. 
 
Administering the experiment through the computer made the withholding status manipulation more realistic.  
Participants in the personal involvement condition were provided with different sources of information and asked to 
estimate their client’s tax liability so that the client would have very little balance due or payable.  Participants were then 
told that their estimate was too low (high) and their client is in an unexpected tax payment (refund) situation at year-end. 
 This manipulation would not have been believable if presented in a paper booklet.  The computer program used the 
actual tax number estimated by the participant and added (subtracted) a set amount to arrive at the unexpected tax 
payment (refund) position.  This was designed to make the manipulation more believable than if it were presented in 
booklet form. 
 
Dependent Variable  
 
After making their final estimated payment computation, participants were informed of the total amount of 
taxes for the year and the amount of the year-end payment due (refund).  They were then provided with a short case 
scenario containing an ambiguous tax deduction.  The ambiguous tax deduction case scenario involved the issue of 
whether asbestos removal costs must be capitalized under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 263, or whether they 
may be deducted as a current expense under IRC section 162.  There is no conclusive answer as to the proper tax 
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treatment of asbestos removal costs.   
 
After reviewing the ambiguous tax deduction scenario, participants were asked whether they would prepare and 
sign an income tax return containing a deduction of the asbestos removal costs.  Their responses were measured on a 10-
point Likert-type scale and used as the dependent variable.   
 
Sample Characteristics  
 
A total of 198 experimental packages containing a computer diskette and instructions on how to complete the 
experiment were mailed to a contact person at the 18 different offices of the accounting firms that agreed to participate in 
the study.  The contact person was instructed to randomly distribute the packages to participating members of their firms, 
collect the completed experimental materials within a stated period of time, and return all of the completed experimental 
packages to the researchers.   
 
Because some accounting firms agreed to provide participants from more than one office location, the actual 
number of firms participating was 11.  These 11 participating firms were composed of six “Big 6" firms (now “Big 5”), 
three regional firms, and two local firms.  The 18 participating offices were located in eight different cities and five 
different states, primarily in the midwest and southern regions of the United States.   
 
A total of 107 experimental packages were received from 14 different offices (four offices failed to return the 
experimental packages).  One hundred seven out of 198 experimental diskettes were returned, a response rate of 54%.  
Three of the packages contained no data, so the number of respondents used in data analysis was 104.   
 
Participants ranged in age from 22 to 54, with a mean age of 30.7.   The average participant had 5.3 years of 
experience in public accounting, with 4.7 of those years spent specializing in tax.  The range of experience levels was 
quite broad, ranging from individuals just beginning their accounting careers to individuals who had been in public 
accounting for over 25 years. 
 
The participants came from a variety of educational backgrounds.  Most of the participants (88.5%) held a 
bachelors degree in accounting, although some had other business or nonbusiness degrees.  In addition, over 20% of 
participants had a masters degree in tax.  Fifty-two percent of the participants were male and 48% were female.  The 
majority of participants (62.5%) were CPAs. 
 
A majority of the participants (62.8%) practiced in “Big 6” (now “Big 5”) accounting firms.  The remainder 
came from regional (24.5%) or local (12.7%) firms.  All levels of experience were represented.  Approximately five 
percent of the participants classified themselves as partners, 25% as managers, 8% as supervisors, 26% as seniors, and 
36% as staff accountants.   
 
Manipulation Check — Ambiguity of Tax Deduction  
 
The tax deduction case scenario presented to the participants was designed to be ambiguous.  The issue of 
whether asbestos removal costs must be capitalized or can be expensed was used.  The majority of tax practitioners agree 
that there is no conclusive answer as to the tax treatment of these costs.  The case scenario summarized both sides of the 
issue in order to emphasize that there is no conclusive answer to the question of whether asbestos removal costs must be 
capitalized.  The case scenario was pretested by several tax practitioners and revised in order to ensure that it was 
ambiguous.   
 
After completing the experimental task, participants were asked whether asbestos removal costs: (1) are 
deductible, (2) must be capitalized, or (3) are an ambiguous tax issue, meaning it is not clear whether they are currently 
deductible or must be capitalized. 
 
The result of a one-way ANOVA with the participants’ assessment of the ambiguity of asbestos removal costs 
as the dependent variable was significant (F = 12.99, P = .0001).   The majority (over 80%) of participants thought that 
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the tax treatment of asbestos removal costs was ambiguous.  In addition, the number of participants who thought asbestos 
removal costs were clearly deductible was about equal to the number who thought that asbestos removal costs must be 
capitalized.  Therefore, the manipulation of the ambiguous tax case scenario was successful. 
 
Manipulation Check — Psychological Commitment  
 
Psychological commitment was measured by asking participants manipulation check questions after they 
completed the experimental material.  The results of these measures of psychological commitment inducement are 
mixed.  In the first psychological commitment manipulation check question, participants were asked:  “How responsible 
did you feel for Smith Homebuilding ending up in an unexpected tax due (refund) position?”  The argument supporting 
this measure of psychological commitment is that tax preparers who feel responsible for a client’s year-end payment 
status will be more psychologically committed to that status than those who do not feel responsible.  The result of a one-
way ANOVA performed with the participants’ answers to this question (as measured on a 10-point Likert-type scale) as 
the dependent variable was significant (F = 4.54, p = .005).  Details regarding the response of participants in each of the 
four experimental groups are reported in Table 1.  Participants who made estimated payment calculations (groups A and 
B) felt more responsible than participants who did not (groups C and D).  This is consistent with an effective 
psychological commitment inducement.  Participants in the tax refund condition who made estimated payment 
calculations (Group B) felt more responsible than participants in any of the other conditions.  The cell means of groups A 
and B were not significantly different from one another.  The cell mean of group B was significantly different than the 
cell means of groups C and D.   Overall, these results provide moderate support for the effectiveness of the psychological 
commitment manipulation.   
 
Table 1- Responsibility Participants Felt for Their Clients’ Year-end Payment Status 
 
 
Experimental       Standard 
Group  Description    Mean  Deviation     Grouping* 
  
B  Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Refund   5.20  2.342  X 
   
A  Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Payment Due  4.31  2.294  X Y 
 
D  No Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Refund  3.58  2.175   Y 
 
C  No Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Payment Due  3.16  1.668   Y 
 
* means with the same letter are not significantly different. 
 
In the second psychological commitment manipulation check question, participants were asked: “How 
committed did you feel to assisting Smith Homebuilding in meeting its tax planning goals?”  The result of a one-way 
ANOVA performed with participants’ answers to this question (as measured on a 10-point Likert-type scale) as the 
dependent variable was not significant (F = 0.85, p = .471).  As reported in Table 2, there was no significant difference in 
how participants in the four experimental groups responded to this question.  The means of the four experimental groups 
ranged from 7.02 to 7.91.  Participants in all four experimental groups indicated that they were reasonably committed to 
assisting Smith Homebuilding in meeting its tax planning goals.   
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Table 2 - Commitment of Participants to Assisting Clients in Meeting Their Tax Planning Goals 
 
Experimental 
Condition  Description    Mean*  Standard Deviation 
  
A   Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Payment Due  7.71   2.203   
B   Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Refund  7.39   2.073 
C   No Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Payment Due  7.91   1.885 
D   No Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Refund  7.02   2.563 
 
* None of the cell means is significantly different from one another at a .05 level of significance. 
 
 
Manipulation Check — Gain or Loss Position  
 
The last manipulation check asked whether participants viewed themselves in a gain position or a loss position 
prior to considering the potential deduction of asbestos removal costs.  Prospect theory predicts that decision makers will 
be risk-seeking in a loss situation and risk-averse in a gain situation.  As discussed earlier, one of the possible reasons for 
the lack of results found in previous research in the tax preparer decision-making area is that tax preparers do not view 
themselves in a gain or loss position.  It is the client’s year-end gain or loss position, not the tax preparer’s.   
 
The result of the one-way ANOVA with participants’ answers to this manipulation question as the dependent 
variable was significant (F = 5.24, p = .0242).  Participants correctly framed the position they were in before considering 
the potential deduction of the asbestos removal costs 68.3% of the time.  In other words, their framing of the situation 
they were in as a gain or a loss situation was consistent with the prediction of prospect theory 68.3% of the time.  At first 
glance this manipulation appears successful. However, participants who framed their situation as a gain selected more 
aggressive tax reporting strategies than those who framed their situation as a loss.  This difference in aggressiveness 
(6.42 to 5.18) is significant at the .05 level.  This result is inconsistent with the predictions of prospect theory, in which 
decision makers in a loss situation are predicted to be more aggressive than decision makers in a gain situation.  One 
possible explanation for this finding is that participants may not have properly understood what was meant by gain or 
loss position.   Even when participants’ answer to the gain/loss manipulation question indicated that they correctly 
framed the position they were in before considering the potential deduction of asbestos removal costs, their level of 
aggressiveness was inconsistent with the predictions of prospect theory.   
 
Analysis of Results  
 
Although random assignment of subjects to the four experimental conditions reduces the possibility of 
significant covariates, several demographic questions were included to provide an additional level of control. Possible 
covariates controlled for include the participants’ age, sex, experience level, IRS audit experience, perception of the risk 
of IRS audit, and level of aggressiveness. 
 
Two of the covariates, number of years experience in tax (TAXEXP) and gender (GENDER) were found to be 
significant.  Therefore, ANCOVA was used to test the hypotheses, with TAXEXP and GENDER included as covariates. 
 
Two other covariates, rank in accounting firm (RANK) and number of IRS audits worked on during career 
(AUDITS), were marginally significant.  Both of these covariates were highly correlated with TAXEXP and thus were 
not included in data analysis reported below.  Inclusion of these variables in the analysis did not significantly change the 
results. 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                            Volume 1, Number 4 
 94 
TAXEXP was transformed into a categorical variable for data analysis purposes.  The median number of years 
of tax experience of the participants was three.  Participants with three or less years of tax experience were included in 
the “low experience” group.  Participants with four or more years of experience were included in the “high experience” 
group.  Separating the low-experienced tax practitioners from the high-experienced tax practitioners by other methods 
did not significantly change the results. 
 
Results of ANCOVA  
 
The results of the ANCOVA with the tax reporting aggressiveness of the participants as the dependent variable 
(DV), VERSION (experimental group A, B, C or D) as the independent variable, and TAXEXP and GENDER as 
covariates, are reported in Table 3.  All possible interactions are also included in the model. 
 
The overall model was not significant (Pr > F = .1533).  In addition, VERSION was not significant.  Both 
covariates were moderately significant.  None of the interactions was significant.   
 
Table 3 - Results of ANCOVA 
 
DV = VERSION, GENDER, VERSION*GENDER, TAXEXP, TAXEXP*VERSION, GENDER*TAXEXP 
 
Source    DF Sum of Squares  Mean Square   F-Value  Pr > F 
Model     12 110.2767     9.1897   1.46  0.1533 
Error     88 542.4293     6.2776  
Correct Total  100 658.8694 
 
Source   DF Type III SS      MS   F-Value  Pr > F 
VERSION   3 20.9610      6.9870   1.11  0.3482 
GENDER   1 20.5547   20.5547   3.27  0.0738* 
VERSION*GENDER  3   2.8378       0.9459   0.15  0.9290 
TAXEXP   1 21.8267   21.8267   3.48  0.0656* 
VERSION*TAXEXP   3 13.0246       4.3415   0.69  0.5596 
GENDER*TAXEXP  1   0.9638       0.9639   0.15  0.6961 
 
* Significant at the .10 level 
 
The means of VERSION are reported in Table 4.  As can be seen, only experimental groups B and C were 
significantly different from each other in terms of aggressiveness, and only at the .09 level.  The other groups were not 
significantly different from one another in terms of aggressiveness. Contrary to what was predicted, participants in group 
C were more aggressive than participants in group A. 
 
Table 4 - Mean of DV in each of the experimental groups (VERSION) 
 
Experimental      LS   Standard Error 
Group    Description   Mean   LS Mean 
 
A   Estimated Payment    
Calculations/Payment Due  5.83       0.556    
B   Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Tax Refund  5.48*       0.534 
C   No Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Payment Due  6.75*       0.544 
D   No Estimated Payment  
Calculations/Tax Refund  6.34          0.506 
 
*The cell means of experimental groups B and C are different from one another at the .09 level of significance. 
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As reported in Table 5, males were more aggressive than females.  The difference in adjusted means was 
significant at the .08 level.  Table 6 shows that there was no interaction between GENDER and VERSION.  Males were 
more aggressive than females in all experimental conditions. 
 
Table 5 - Mean of DV by GENDER 
 
Std Err 
GENDER   Number  LSMean LSMean Pr > T 
 
Male        53  6.5884  0.3525  0.0738  
Female       48  5.5927  0.4213  
 
 
Table 6 - Mean of DV by GENDER and VERSION 
 
VERSION 
A  B  C  D 
 
Male    6.068  6.038  7.459  7.023 
Female   5.639  4.773  6.098  5.358  
 
 
As reported in Table 7, experienced tax practitioners took more aggressive tax reporting positions than less 
experienced tax practitioners.  This result was significant at the .07 level.  There was no interaction between TAXEXP 
and VERSION.  As can be seen in Table 8, more experienced tax practitioners were more aggressive than less 
experienced tax practitioners in all experimental conditions.  This finding is consistent with several other studies in 
which tax preparer decision-making was found to be influenced by experience.  The effect of experience appears to be 
robust to different client involvement and year-end payment status situations.   
 
Table 7 - Mean of DV by TAXEXP 
 
Experience Level   Number  LSMean Std Err  Pr > T 
 
High        43  6.6010  0.4272  0.0656  
Low        48  5.5802  0.3430  
 
 
Table 8 - Mean of DV by TAXEXP and VERSION 
 
     VERSION 
A  B  C  D 
 
High Experience   6.068  6.038  7.459  7.023 
Low Experience   5.639  4.773  6.098  5.358 
 
Results of Hypothesis Tests  
 
Hypothesis One predicted that tax preparers whose personal involvement in calculating a client’s estimated tax 
payments resulted in their client facing an unexpected tax payment at year-end (group A) will take more aggressive tax 
reporting positions than tax preparers who were not involved in creating their client’s year-end tax payment position 
(group C).  As reported in Table 4, the difference in the cell means of experimental groups A and C was not significant.  
It is interesting to note, however, that the direction of the difference in cell means was opposite of what was expected.  In 
the situation where a tax preparer’s client was in an unexpected year-end tax payment position, participants not involved 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                            Volume 1, Number 4 
 96 
in calculating their client’s estimated payment amounts were more aggressive than participants who were involved (6.75 
to 5.83).   
 
Hypothesis Two predicted that tax preparers whose personal involvement in calculating a client’s estimated tax 
payments resulted in their client receiving an unexpected tax refund at year-end will take less aggressive tax reporting 
positions than tax preparers who were not involved in creating their client’s year-end refund position.  As reported in 
Table 4, the difference in cell means between experimental groups B and D was not significant (5.48 to 6.34).  Thus, 
although the difference is in the predicted direction, Hypothesis Two was not supported.    
 
Although Hypotheses One and Two were not supported, several interesting findings emerge from this study.  
First, consistent with what was predicted for psychologically committed tax preparers with a client in a year-end tax 
refund situation, participants in experimental group B were less aggressive than participants in any of the other three 
experimental groups, although the difference was only significant in the case of experimental group C.  Also, gender and 
experience in tax were found to have an effect on tax preparer decision-making.   
 
Discussion of Research Results 
 
Neither Hypothesis One nor Hypothesis Two was supported.  There are several possible reasons for this lack of 
results.  The design of the study may not have been sufficient to capture the impact of prospect theory on tax preparer 
decision-making.  Participants, even in experimental groups A and B, may not have viewed the client’s year-end 
payment status as their (the tax preparer’s) own gain or loss position.  The inconclusive results reached in both the 
psychological commitment and gain/loss position manipulation check questions support this possibility.  As reported 
previously, participants did not behave in a manner consistent with the predictions of prospect theory in those cases 
where their answer to the gain/loss manipulation question indicated that they correctly framed the decision as a gain or 
loss position, respectively.  It is possible that participants may not have understood the question.  Thus, it is possible that 
participants not properly framing their client’s year-end payment position as a gain or loss position caused the 
inconclusive results.   
 
The inconclusive results also may have been caused by an ineffective psychological commitment inducement.  
It is possible that psychological commitment causes tax preparers to frame situations and behave in a manner consistent 
with the predictions of prospect theory in practice, and that the lack of results is due to the difficulty of inducing 
psychological commitment in an experimental setting.   
 
Another possible reason for the lack of results in this study, and one that has been suggested by prior 
researchers in this area, is the possibility that “prospect theory is not a powerful theory for understanding decision 
making in a tax context” (Newberry et al. 1993, p. 450).   
 
Conclusion 
 
This research makes a contribution to the literature by introducing psychological commitment as a moderating 
variable in the application of prospect theory to tax preparer decision-making.  This research, however, failed to find 
evidence in support of either hypothesis.  The study does provide some evidence that the tax reporting aggressiveness of 
tax preparers is influenced by various factors, including client year-end payment status, tax preparer involvement in 
estimated payment calculations, gender, and tax experience of tax preparers.  The main results of the study, however, are 
inconsistent with prospect theory and difficult to interpret.   
 
Given the inconclusive results of this study, there is still much uncertainty regarding how, or if, prospect theory 
can be applied to tax preparer decision-making.  Further research is needed before prospect theory can be successfully 
applied to assist tax preparers in their decision-making.  The inconclusive results of this research add evidence to the 
suggestion that prospect theory may not be an appropriate theory for studying tax preparer decision making.   
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